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Abstract—
Network coding substantially increases network throughput.
But since it involves mixing of information inside the network,
a single corrupted packet generated by a malicious node can
end up contaminating all the information reaching a destination,
preventing decoding.
This paper introduces the first distributed polynomial-time rate-
optimal network codes that work in the presence of Byzantine
nodes. We present algorithms that target adversaries with different
attacking capabilities. When the adversary can eavesdrop on all
links and jam zO links , our first algorithm achieves a rate of
C − 2zO, where C is the network capacity. In contrast, when the
adversary has limited snooping capabilities, we provide algorithms
that achieve the higher rate of C − zO.
Our algorithms attain the optimal rate given the strength of
the adversary. They are information-theoretically secure. They
operate in a distributed manner, assume no knowledge of the
topology, and can be designed and implemented in polynomial-
time. Furthermore, only the source and destination need to be
modified; non-malicious nodes inside the network are oblivious to
the presence of adversaries and implement a classical distributed
network code. Finally, our algorithms work over wired and wireless
networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Network coding allows the routers to mix the information
content in packets before forwarding them. This mixing has
been theoretically proven to maximize network throughput [1],
[17], [13]. It can be done in a distributed manner with low com-
plexity, and is robust to packet losses and network failures [8],
[21]. Furthermore, recent implementations of network coding
for wired and wireless environments demonstrate its practical
benefits [16], [6].
But what if the network contains malicious nodes? A ma-
licious node may pretend to forward packets from source to
destination, while in reality it injects corrupted packets into
the information flow. Since network coding makes the routers
mix packets’ content, a single corrupted packet can end up
corrupting all the information reaching a destination. Unless this
problem is solved, network coding may perform much worse
than pure forwarding in the presence of adversaries.
The interplay of network coding and Byzantine adversaries
has been examined by a few recent papers. Some detect the
presence of an adversary [10], others correct the errors he injects
into the codes under specific conditions [7], [12], [19], and a
few bound the maximum achievable rate in such adverse envi-
ronments [3], [28]. But attaining optimal rates using distributed
and low-complexity codes is still an open problem.
This paper designs distributed polynomial-time rate-optimal
network codes that combat Byzantine adversaries. We present
three algorithms that target adversaries with different strengths.
The adversary can always inject zO packets, but his listening
power varies. When the adversary is omniscient, i.e., he ob-
serves transmissions on the entire network, our codes achieve
the rate of C−2zO, with high probability. When the adversary’s
knowledge is limited, either because he eavesdrops only on a
subset of the links or the source and destination have a low-rate
secret-channel, our algorithms deliver the higher rate of C−zO.
The intuition underlying all of our algorithms is that the
aggregate packets from the adversarial nodes can be thought
of as a second source. The information received at the desti-
nation is a linear transform of the source’s and the adversary’s
information. Given enough linear combinations (enough coded
packets), the destination can decode both sources. The question
however is how does the destination distill out the source’s
information from the received mixture. To do so, the source’s
information has to satisfy certain constraints that the attacker’s
data cannot satisfy. This can be done by judiciously adding
redundancy at the source. For example, the source may add
redundancy to ensure that certain functions evaluate to zero
on the original source’s data, and thus can be used to distill
the source’s data from the adversary’s. The challenge addressed
herein is to design the redundancy that achieves the optimal
rates.
This paper makes several contributions. The algorithms
presented herein are the first distributed algorithms with
polynomial-time complexity in design and implementation, yet
are rate-optimal. In fact, since pure forwarding is a special
case of network coding, being rate-optimal, our algorithms also
achieve a higher rate than any approach that does not use
network coding. They assume no knowledge of the topology
and work in both wired and wireless networks. Furthermore,
implementing our algorithms involves only a slight modification
of the source and destination while the internal nodes can
continue to use standard network coding.
II. ILLUSTRATING EXAMPLE
We illustrate the intuition underlying our approach using
the toy example in Fig. 1. Calvin wants to prevent the flow of
information from Alice to Bob, or at least minimize it. All links
have a capacity of one packet per unit time. Further, Calvin
connects to the three routers over a wireless link, shown in
Fig. 1 as a dashed hyperedge. The network capacity, C, is by
definition the min-cut from Alice to Bob. It is equal to 3 packets.
The min-cut from Calvin to the destination is zO = 1 packet
per unit time. Hence, the maximum rate from Alice to Bob in
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Fig. 1—A simple example. Alice transmits to Bob. Calvin injects
corrupted packets into their communication. The grey nodes in
the middle perform network coding.
this scenario is bounded by C − zO = 2 packets per unit time
as proven in [12].
We express each packet as a vector of n bytes, where n is
a sufficiently large number. The routers create random linear
combinations of the packets they receive. Hence, every unit of
time Bob receives the packets:
y˜1 = α1x˜1 + β1z˜
y˜2 = α2x˜2 + β2z˜
y˜3 = α3x˜3 + β3z˜,
(1)
where x˜i’s are the three packets Alice sent, z˜ is the packet
Calvin sent, αi and βi are random coefficients.
In our example, the routers operate over bytes; the ith byte
in an outgoing packet is a linear combination of ith bytes in the
incoming packets. Thus, (1) also describes the relation between
the individual bytes in y˜i’s and the corresponding bytes in x˜i’s
and z˜.
Since the routers mix the content of the packets, Alice cannot
just sign her packets and have Bob discard all packets with
incorrect signatures. To decode, Bob has to somehow distill the
x˜i’s from the y˜i’s he receives.
As a first attempt at solving the problem, let us assume
that Bob knows the topology, i.e., he knows that the packets
he receives are produced using (1). Further, let us assume that
he knows the random coefficients used by the routers to code
the packets, i.e., he knows the values of αi’s and βi’s. To
decode, Bob has to solve (1). These are three equations with
four unknowns z˜, x˜1, x˜2 and x˜3. Hence, Bob cannot decode.
To address the above situation, Alice needs to add redun-
dancy to her transmitted packets. After all, as noted above, for
the particular example in Fig. 1, Alice’s rate is bounded by 2
packets per unit time. Thus, Alice should send no more than 2
packets worth of information. She can use the third packet for
added redundancy. Suppose Alice sets
x˜3 = x˜1 + x˜2. (2)
This coding strategy is public to both Bob and Calvin. Com-
bining (2) with (1), Bob obtains a system of 4 equations with
4 unknowns, which he can solve to decode.
But in the general case, Bob knows nothing about the
coefficients used by the routers, the topology, or the overall
network transform. To keep the example tractable, we assume
that the βi’s are unknown to Bob, whereas the other coefficients
are known.
Given (1) and (2), Bob is faced with 4 equations and 7
unknowns, and thus cannot decode. But note that Bob does not
need to find both βi’s and z˜; finding their product is sufficient
to find x˜. (This is because the βis and ~z always appear as the
product term βi~z in (1).) Hence he is left with 4 equations and
6 unknowns.
The first idea we use is that while z˜ is a whole unknown
packet of n bytes, each of the coefficients βi is a single byte.
Thus, instead of devoting a whole vector of n bytes for added
redundancy (as in (2)), Alice just needs three extra bytes of
redundancy to compensate for the βi’s being unknown.
Alice imposes constraints on her data to help Bob to decode.
For instance, a simple constraint could be that the first byte in
each packet equals zero. This constrain provides Bob with three
additional equations. So, rewriting (1) for the first byte of each
packet, Bob would get a scaled version of the βi’s i.e., they are
all multiplied by z1.
y1,1 = α1x1,1 + β1z1 = β1z1
y2,1 = α2x2,1 + β2z1 = β2z1
y3,1 = α3x3,1 + β3z1 = β3z1
, (3)
Our second observation is that the scaled version of the βi’s
suffices for Bob to decode x˜. This can be seen by a simple
algebraic manipulation of (1). Bob can rewrite the equations
in (1) by multiplying and dividing the second term with z1 and
appending (2) to obtain
y˜1 = α1x˜1 + (β1z1)(z˜/z1)
y˜2 = α2x˜2 + (β2z1)(z˜/z1)
y˜3 = α3x˜3 + (β3z1)(z˜/z1)
x˜3 = x˜1 + x˜2.
(4)
Notice that Bob already knows all three βiz1 terms from (3).
The term (z˜/z1) can be considered a single unknown because
Bob does not care about estimating the exact value of z˜. Now
Bob has 4 equations with 4 unknowns and they can be solved
to decode as before.
One complication still remains. If Calvin knows the con-
straints on Alice’s data, he knows that the first byte of each
packet is zero. So to ensure that Bob does not obtain any
information about the βi’s from (4), Calvin can just set the
first byte in his packet z1 to zero.
There are two ways out of this situation. Suppose Alice
could communicate to Bob a small message that is secret from
Calvin. In this case, she could compute a small number of
hashes of her data, and transmit them to Bob. These hashes
correspond to constraints on her data, which enables Bob to
decode. If Alice cannot communicate secretly with Bob, she
leverages the fact that Calvin can inject only one fake packet.
Since Calvin’s packet is n bytes long, he can cancel out at most
n hashes. If Alice injects n + 1 hashes, there must be at least
one hash Calvin cannot cancel. This hash enables Bob to find
the βi’s and decode. Notice, however, that the n+1 additional
constraints imposed on the bytes in ~x1 and ~x2 means that Alice
can only transmit at most n − 1 bytes of data to Bob. For a
large number of bytes n in a packet, this rate is asymptotically
optimal against an all-knowing adversary [3].
The rest of this paper considers the general problem of
network coding over completely unknown topology, in the
presence of an adversary who has partial or full knowledge of
the network and transmissions in it.
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Fig. 2—A simple scenario showing how network coding improves
throughput. All links have a capacity of one packet per unit of
time. By sending the XOR of ai and bi on the middle link, we can
deliver two packets per unit of time to both receivers.
III. RELATED WORK
We start with a brief summary of network coding, followed
by a survey of prior work on Byzantine adversaries in networks.
A. Network Coding Background
The idea underlying network coding is often illustrated using
the famous butterfly example by Ahlswede et.al [1]. Consider
the network in Fig. 2, where source S1 wants to deliver the
stream of packets ai to both R1 and R2, and source S2 wants to
send the stream of packets bi to the same two receivers. Assume
all links have a capacity of one packet per unit of time. If routers
only forward the packets they receive, the middle link becomes
a bottleneck, which for every unit of time, can either deliver ai
to R1 or bi to R2. In contrast, if the router feeding the middle
link XORs the two packets and sends ai ⊕ bi, as shown in the
figure, both receivers obtain two distinct packets in every unit
of time.
Work on network coding started with a pioneering paper
by Ahlswede et al. [1], which establishes the value of coding
in the routers and provides theoretical bounds on the capacity
of such networks. The combination of [20], [17], [13] shows
that, for multicast traffic, linear codes achieves the maximum
capacity bounds, and coding and decoding can be done in
polynomial time. Additionally, Ho et al. show that the above
is true even when the routers pick random coefficients [8].
Researchers have extended the above results to a variety of
areas including wireless networks [21], [15], [16], energy [27],
secrecy [2], content distribution [6], and distributed storage [14].
B. Byzantine Adversaries in Networks
A Byzantine attacker is a malicious adversary hidden in
a network, capable of eavesdropping and jamming commu-
nications. Prior research has examined these attacks in the
presence of network coding and without it. In the absence
of network coding, Dolev et al. [5] consider the problem
of communicating over a known graph containing Byzantine
adversaries. They show that for k adversarial nodes, reliable
communication is possible only if the graph has more than
2k + 1 vertex connectivity. Subramaniam extends this result
to unknown graphs [25]. Pelc et al. address the same problem
Scheme Charles et.al. [4] Jaggi et.al. [12] Ours
Info. Theoretic Security No Yes Yes
Distributed Yes No Yes
Internal Node Complexity High Low Low
Decoding Complexity High Exponential Low
General Graphs No Yes Yes
Universal No No Yes
TABLE I—Comparison between the results in this paper and some
prior papers.
in wireless networks by modeling malicious nodes as locally
bounded Byzantine faults, i.e., nodes can overhear and jam
packets only in their neighborhood [23].
The interplay of network coding and Byzantine adversaries
was first examined in [10], which detects the existence of an
adversary but does not provide an error-correction scheme.
This has been followed by the work of Cai and Yeung [28],
[3], who generalize standard bounds on error-correcting codes
to networks, without providing any explicit algorithms for
achieving these bounds. Our work presents a constructive design
to achieve those bounds.
The problem of correcting errors in the presence of both
network coding and Byzantine adversaries has been considered
by a few prior proposals. Earlier work [19], [7] assumes a
centralized trusted authority that provides hashes of the original
packets to each node in the network. More recent work by
Charles et al. [4] obviates the need for a trusted entity under the
assumption that the majority of packets received by each node
is uncorrupted. In contrast to the above two schemes which are
cryptographically secure, in a previous work [12], we consider
an information-theoretically rate-optimal solution to Byzantine
attacks for wired networks, which however requires a centralized
design. This paper builds on the above prior schemes to combine
their desirable traits; it provides a distributed solution that is
information-theoretically rate optimal and can be designed and
implemented in polynomial time. Furthermore, our algorithms
have new features; they assume no knowledge of the topology,
do not require any new functionality at internal nodes, and
work for both wired and wireless networks. Table I highlights
similarities and differences from prior work.
IV. MODEL & DEFINITIONS
We use a general model that encompasses both wired and
wireless networks. To simplify notation, we consider only the
problem of communicating from a single source to a single
destination. But similar to most network coding algorithms, our
techniques generalize to multicast traffic.
A. Threat Model
There is a source, Alice, and a destination, Bob, who
communicate over a wired or wireless network. There is also an
attacker Calvin, hidden somewhere in the network. Calvin aims
to prevent the transfer of information from Alice to Bob, or at
least to minimize it. He can observe some of the transmissions,
and can inject his own. When he injects his own packets, he
pretends they are part of the information flow from Alice to
Bob.
4Calvin is quite strong. He is computationally unbounded. He
knows the encoding and decoding schemes of Alice and Bob,
and the network code implemented by the interior nodes. He
also knows the exact network realization.
B. Network and Code Model
This section describes the network model, the packet format,
and how the network transforms the packets.
Network Model: The network is modeled as a hypergraph [22].
Each packet transmission corresponds to a hyperedge directed
from the transmitting node to the set of observer nodes. For
wired networks, the hyperedge is a simple point-to-point link.
For wireless, each such hyperedge is determined by instanta-
neous channel realizations (packets may be lost due to fading
or collisions) and connects the transmitter to all nodes that hear
the transmission. The hypergraph is unknown to Alice and Bob
prior to transmission.
Source: Alice generates incompressible data that she wishes
to deliver to Bob over the network. To do so, Alice encodes
her data as dictated by the encoding algorithm (described in
subsequent sections). She divides the encoded data into batches
of b packets. For clarity, we focus on the encoding and decoding
of one batch.
A packet contains a sequence of n symbols from the finite
field Fq. All arithmetic operations henceforth are done over
symbols from Fq. (see the treatment in [18]). Out of the n
symbols in Alice’s packet, δn symbols are redundancy added
by the source.
Alice organizes the data in each batch into a matrix X as
shown in Fig. 3. We denote the (i, j)th element in the matrix by
x(i, j). The ith row in the matrix X is just the ith packet in the
batch. Fig. 3 shows that similarly to standard network codes [9],
some of the redundancy in the batch is devoted to sending the
identity matrix, I . Also, as in [9], Alice takes random linear
combinations of the rows of X to generate her transmitted
packets. As the packets traverse the network, the internal nodes
apply a linear transform to the batch. The identity matrix
receives the same linear transform. The destination discovers
the linear relation between the packets it receives and those
transmitted by inspecting how I was transformed.
Adversary: Let the matrix Z be the information Calvin injects
into each batch. The size of this matrix is zO × n, where zO is
the size of the min-cut from Calvin to the destination.
Destination: Analogously to how Alice generates X , the des-
tination Bob organizes the received packets into a matrix Y .
The ith received packet corresponds to the ith row of Y . Note
that the number of received packets, and therefore the number
of rows of Y , is a variable dependent on the network topology.
The column rank of eY , however, is b + zO. Bob attempts to
reconstruct Alice’s information, X , using the matrix of received
packets Y .
C. Definitions
We define the following concepts.
• The network capacity, denoted by C, is the time-average
of the maximum number of packets that can be delivered
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Fig. 3—Alice, Bob and Calvin’s information matrices.
from Alice to Bob, assuming no adversarial interference,
i.e., the max flow. It can be also expressed as the min-cut
from source to destination. (For the corresponding multicast
case, C is defined as the minimum of the min-cuts over all
destinations.)
• The error probability is the probability that Bob’s recon-
struction of Alice’s information is inaccurate.
• The rate, R, is the number of information bits in a batch
amortized by the length of a packet in bits.
• The rate R is said to be achievable if for any ǫ > 0, any
δ > 0, and sufficiently large n, there exists a block-length-n
network code with a redundancy δ and a probability of error
less than ǫ.
• A code is said to be universal if the code design is indepen-
dent of zO.
V. NETWORK TRANSFORM
This section explains how Alice’s packets get transformed
as they travel through the network. It examines the effect the
adversary has on the received packets, and Bob’s decoding
problem.
The network performs a classical distributed network
code [9]. Specifically, each packet transmitted by an internal
node is a random linear combination of its incoming packets.
Thus, the effect of the network at the destination can be
summarized as follows.
Y = TX + TZ→Y Z, (5)
where X is the batch of packets sent by Alice, Z refers to the
packets Calvin injects into Alice’s batch, and Y is the received
batch. The variable T refers to the linear transform from Alice
to Bob, while TZ→Y refers to the linear transform from Calvin
to Bob.
As explained in §IV, a classical random network code’s X
includes the identity matrix as part of each batch. The identity
matrix sent by Alice incurs the same transform as the rest of
the batch. Thus,
Tˆ = TI + TZ→Y L, (6)
where Tˆ and L are the columns corresponding to I’s location
in Y and Z respectively, as shown in Fig. 3.
In standard network coding, there is no adversary, i.e., Z =
0 and L = 0, and thus Tˆ = T . The destination receives a
description of the network transform in Tˆ and can decode X as
5Variable Definition
b Number of packets in a batch.
zO Number of packets Calvin can inject.
zI Number of packets Calvin can hear.
n Length of each packet.
δ Fractional redundancy introduced by Alice.
Tˆ Proxy of the transfer matrix T representing the
network transform.
TABLE II—Terms used in the paper.
Tˆ−1Y . In the presence of the adversary, however, the destination
needs to solve (5) and (6) to extract the value of X .
By substituting T from (6), (5) can be simplified to get
Y = TˆX + TZ→Y (Z − LX) (7)
= TˆX + E, (8)
where E is a b × n matrix that characterizes Calvin’s interfer-
ence. Note that the matrix Tˆ , which Bob knows, acts as a proxy
transfer matrix for T , which he doesn’t know.
Note that in (5), all terms other than Y are unknown. Further,
it is non-linear due to the cross-product terms, TX and TZ→Y Z .
In contrast, (8) is linear in the unknowns X and E. The rest
of this work focuses on solving (8) under different assumptions
on Calvin’s strength.
VI. SUMMARY OF RESULTS
We have three main results. Each result corresponds to a
distributed, rate-optimal, polynomial-time algorithm that defeats
an adversary of a particular type. The optimality of these rates
has been proven by prior work [3], [28], [12]. Our work,
however, provides a construction of distributed codes/algorithms
that achieve optimal rates.
(1) Shared Secret Model: This model assumes that Alice and
Bob have a very low rate secret channel, the transmissions on
which are unknown to Calvin. It considers the transmission of
information via network coding in a network where Calvin can
observe all transmissions, and can inject some corrupt packets.
Theorem 1: The Shared Secret algorithm achieves a rate of
C − zO with code-complexity O(nC2). This is the maximum
achievable rate.
In §VII, we prove the above theorem by constructing an algo-
rithm that achieves the bounds. Note that [7] proves a similar
result for a more constrained model where Alice shares a very
low rate secret channel with all nodes in the network, and the
operations performed by internal nodes are computationally ex-
pensive. Further, their result guarantees cryptographic security,
while we provide information-theoretic security.
(2) Omniscient Adversary Model: This model assumes an
omniscient adversary, i.e., one from whom nothing is hidden. In
particular, Alice and Bob have no shared secrets hidden from
Calvin. It also assumes that the min-cut from the adversary
to the destination, zO, is less than C/2. Prior work proves
that without this condition, it is impossible for the source
and the destination to reliably communicate without a secret
channel [12]. In §VIII, we prove the following.
Theorem 2: The Omniscient Adversary algorithm achieves
a rate of C − 2zO with code-complexity O((nC)3). This is the
maximum achievable rate.
(3) Limited Adversary Model: In this model, Calvin is limited
in his eavesdropping power; he can observe at most zI transmit-
ted packets. Exploiting this weakness of the adversary results
in an algorithm that, like the Omniscient Adversary algorithm
operates without a shared secret, but still achieves the higher rate
possible via the Shared Secret algorithm. In particular, in §IX
we prove the following.
Theorem 3: If zI < C − 2zO, the Limited Adversary
algorithm achieves a rate of C − zO with code-complexity
O(nC2 + (nδ)3C4). This is the maximum achievable rate.
VII. SHARED SECRET MODEL
In the Shared Secret model, Alice and Bob have use of a
strong resource, namely a secret channel over which Alice can
transmit a small amount of information to Bob that is secret
from Calvin. Note that since the internal nodes mix corrupted
and uncorrupted packets, Alice cannot just sign her packets and
have Bob check the signature and throw away corrupted packets.
Alice uses the secret channel to send a hash of her information
X to Bob, which Bob can use to distill the corrupted packets
he receives, as explained below.
Shared Secret: Alice generates her secret message in two
steps. She first chooses C parity symbols uniformly at random
from the field Fq . The parity symbols are labeled rd, for d ∈
{1, . . . , C}. Corresponding to the parity symbols, Alice’s parity-
check matrix P is defined as the n × C matrix whose (i, j)th
entry equals (rj)i, i.e., rj to the ith power. The second part of
Alice’s secret message is the b×C hash matrix H , computed as
the matrix product XP . We assume Alice communicates both
the set of parity symbols and the hash matrix H to Bob over
the secret channel. The combination of these two creates the
shared secret, denoted S, between Alice and Bob. The size of
S is C(b+1) symbols, which is small in comparison to Alice’s
information X . (The size of X is b×n; it can be made arbitrarily
large compared to the size of S by increasing the packet size
n.)
Alice’s Encoder: Alice implements the classical random net-
work encoder described in §IV-B.
Bob’s Decoder: Not only is P used by Alice to generate H ,
but is also used by Bob in his decoding process. To be more
precise, Bob computes Y P − TˆH using the messages he gets
from the network and the secret channel. We call the outcome
the syndrome matrix S.
By substituting the value of H and using (8), we obtain
S = Y P − TˆH = (Y − TˆX)P = EP. (9)
Thus, if no adversary was present, the packets would not be
corrupted (i.e., E = 0) and S would be an all-zero matrix. As
shown in §IV, X then equals Tˆ−1Y . If Calvin injects corrupt
packets, S will be a non-zero matrix.
Claim 1: The columns of S span the same vector-space as
the columns of E.
Claim 1, proved in the Appendix, means that Calvin’s interfer-
ence, E, can be written as linear combinations of the columns
of S, i.e., E = AS, where A is a C × n matrix. This enables
6Bob to rewrite (8) as the matrix product
Y = [Tˆ S]
[
X
Aˆ
]
, (10)
Bob does not care about A, but to obtain X , he must solve (10).
Claim 2: The matrix [Tˆ S] has full column-rank.
Claim 2, proved in the Appendix, means that Bob can decode by
simply inverting the matrix [Tˆ S] and multiplying the result by
Y . Since Alice encodes at a rate R = C−zO, the shared secret
algorithm achieves the optimal rate shown by prior work [12].
Of code design, encoding and decoding, both encoding and
decoding require O(nC2) steps. The costliest step for Alice
is the computation of the hash matrix H , and for Bob is the
computation of the syndrome matrix S.
The scheme presented above is universal, i.e., the parameters
of the code do not depend on any knowledge about zO, which in
some sense functions as the “noise parameter” of the network.
Alice therefore has flexibility in tailoring her batch size to the
size of the data which she wishes to transmit and the packet
size allowed by the network. 2
VIII. OMNISCIENT ADVERSARY MODEL
What if we face an omniscient adversary, i.e., Calvin can
observe everything, and there are no shared secrets between
Alice and Bob? We design a network error-correcting code to
defeat such a powerful adversary. Our algorithm achieves a rate
of R = C−2zO, which is lower than in the Shared Secret model.
This is a direct consequence of Calvin’s increased strength.
Recent bounds [3] on network error-correcting codes show that
in fact C − 2zO is the maximum achievable rate for networks
with an omniscient adversary.
Alice’s Encoder: Alice encodes in two steps. To counter
the adversary’s interference, she first generates X by adding
redundancy to her information. She then encodes X using the
encoder defined in §IV-B.
Alice adds redundancy as follows. Her original information
is a length-(bn−δn−b2) column vector U˜. (Here the fractional
redundancy δ, is dependent on zO, the number of packets Calvin
may inject into the network.) Alice converts U˜ into X˜, a length-
bn vector

 U˜R˜
I˜

, where I˜ is just the column version of the
b × b identity matrix. It is generated by stacking columns of
the identity matrix one after the other. The second term, R˜
represents the redundancy Alice adds. The redundancy vector
R˜ is a length-δn column vector generated by solving the matrix
equation for R˜.
D

 U˜R˜
I˜

 = 0.
where D is a δn× bn matrix defined as the redundancy matrix.
D is obtained by choosing each element as an independent
and uniformly random symbol from the finite field Fq. Due
to the dependence of D on δ and thus on zO, the Omniscient
Adversary algorithm is not universal. The redundancy matrix D
is known to all parties – Alice, Bob, and Calvin – and hence
does not constitute a shared secret.
Alice then proceeds to the standard network encoding. She
rearranges X˜, a length-bn vector, into the b× n matrix X . The
jth column of X consists of symbols from the ((j− 1)b+1)th
through (jb)th symbols of X˜. From this point on, Alice’s
encoder implements the classical random network encoder de-
scribed in §IV-B, to generate her transmitted packets.
Bob’s Decoder: As shown in (8), Bob’s received data is related
to Alice and Calvin’s transmitted data as Y = TˆX + E. Bob’s
objective, as in §VII, is to distill out the effect of the error matrix
E and recover the vector X . He can then retrieve Alice’s data
by extracting the first (bn− b2 − δn) symbols to obtain U˜.
To decode, Bob performs the following steps, each of which
corresponds to an elementary matrix operation.
• Determining Calvin’s strength: Bob first determines the
strength of the adversary zO, which is the column rank of
TZ→Y . Bob does not know TZ→Y , but since T and TZ→Y
span disjoint vector spaces, the column rank of Y is equal
to the sum of the column ranks of T and TZ→Y . Since the
column rank of T is simply the batch size b, Bob determines
zO by subtracting b from the column rank of the matrix Y .
• Discarding irrelevant information: Since the classical ran-
dom network code is run without any central coordinating
authority, the packets of information that Bob receives
may be highly redundant. Of the packets Bob receives, he
selectively discards some so that the resulting matrix Y has
b + zO rows, and has full row rank. For him to consider
more packets is useless, since at most b + zO packets of
information have been injected into the network, b from
Alice and zO from Calvin. This operation has the additional
benefit of reducing the complexity of linear operations
that Bob needs to perform henceforth. This reduces the
dimensions of the matrix Tˆ , since Bob can discard the rows
corresponding to the discarded packets.
• Estimating a “basis” for E: If Bob could directly estimate
a basis for the column space of E, then he could simply
decode as in the Shared Secret algorithm. However, there is
no shared secret that enables him to discover a basis for
the column space of E. So, he instead chooses a proxy
error matrix T ′′ whose columns (which are, in general,
linear combinations of columns of both X and E) act as
a proxy error basis for columns of E. This is analogous to
the step (8), where the matrix Tˆ acts as a proxy transfer
matrix for the unknown matrix T .
The matrix T ′′ is obtained as follows. Bob selects zO
columns from Y such that these columns, together with the
b columns of Tˆ , form a basis for the columns of Y . Without
loss of generality, these columns correspond to the first zO
columns of Y (if not, Bob simply permutes the columns of
Y to make it so). The (b+ zO)× zO matrix corresponding
to these first zO columns is denoted T ′′.
• Changing to proxy basis: Bob rewrites Y in the basis
corresponding to the columns of the (b + zO) × (b + zO)
matrix [T ′′ Tˆ ]. Therefore Y can now be written as
Y = [T ′′ Tˆ ]
[
IzO F
Z 0
0 FX Ib
]
. (11)
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[
FZ
FX
]
is defined as the (b+ zO)× (n− (b + zO))
matrix representation of the columns of Y (other than those
in [T ′′ Tˆ ]) in the new basis, with FZ and FX defined as
the sub-matrices of appropriate dimensions.
Bob splits X as X = [X1 X2 X3], where X1 corresponds to
the first zO columns of X , X3 to the last b columns of X ,
and X2 to the remaining columns of X . We perform linear
algebraic manipulations on (11), to reduce it to a form in which
the variables in X are related by a linear transform solely to
quantities that are computable by Bob. Claim 3 summarizes
the effect of these linear algebraic manipulations (proof in
Appendix).
Claim 3: The matrix equation (11) is exactly equivalent to
the matrix equation TˆX2 = Tˆ
(
FX +X1F
Z
)
.
To complete the proof of correctness of our algorithm, we need
only the following claim, proved in the Appendix.
Claim 4: For δ > n(zO + ε), with probability greater than
q−nε, the system of linear equations
TˆX2 = Tˆ
(
FX +X1F
Z
) (12)
DX˜ = 0 (13)
is solvable for X .
The final claim enables Bob to recover X , which contains
Alice’s information at rate R = C − 2zO. Of code design,
encoding and decoding, the most computationally expensive
is decoding. The costliest step involves inverting the linear
transform corresponding to (12)-(13), which is of dimension
O(nC). 2
IX. LIMITED ADVERSARY MODEL
We combine the strengths of the Shared Secret algorithm
and the Omniscient Adversary algorithm, to achieve the higher
rate of C = C − zO, without needing a secret channel. The
caveat is that Calvin’s strength is more limited; the number of
packets he can transmit, zO, and the number he can eavesdrop
on, zI , satisfy the technical constraint
2zO + zI < C. (14)
We call such an adversary a Limited Adversary.
The main idea underlying our Limited Adversary algorithm
is simple. Alice uses the Omniscient Adversary algorithm to
transmit a “short” message to Bob at rate C − 2zO. By (14),
zI < C−2zO, the rate zI at which Calvin eavesdrops is strictly
less than Alice’s rate of transmission C − 2zO. Hence Calvin
cannot decode Alice’s message, but Bob can. This means Alice’s
message to Bob is secret from Calvin. Alice then builds upon
this secret, using the Shared Secret algorithm to transmit the
bulk of her message to Bob at the higher rate C − zO.
Though the following algorithm requires Alice to know zO
and zI , we describe in §IX-A how to change the algorithm to
make it independent of these parameters. The price we pay is
a slight decrease in rate.
Alice’s Encoder: Alice’s encoder follows essentially the schema
described above, except for a technicality – the information she
transmits to Bob via the Omniscient Adversary algorithm is
padded with some random symbols. This is for two reasons.
Firstly, since the Omniscient Adversary algorithm has a prob-
ability of error that decays exponentially with the size of the
input, it isn’t guaranteed to perform well to transmit just a small
message. Secondly, the randomness in the padded symbols also
ensures strong information-theoretic secrecy of the small secret
message, i.e., we can then show (in Claim 5) that Calvin’s best
estimate of any function of the secret information is no better
than if he made random guesses.
Alice’s information X decomposes into two parts [X1 X2].
She uses the information she wishes to transmit to Bob, at rate
R = C − zO −∆, as input to the encoder of the Shared Secret
algorithm, thereby generating the b× n(1−∆) sub-matrix X1.
Here ∆ is a parameter that enables Alice to trade off between
the the probability of error and rate-loss.
The second sub-matrix, X2, which we call the secrecy matrix
is analogous to the secret S used in the Secret Sharing algorithm
described in §VII. The size of X2 is b×∆n. In fact, X2 is an
encoding of the secret S Alice generates in the Shared Secret
algorithm. The b(C + 1) symbols corresponding to the parity
symbols {rd} and the hash matrix H are written in the form
of a length-b(C + 1) column vector. This vector is appended
with symbols chosen uniformly at random from Fq to result in
the length-(C − zO − δn)∆n vector U˜′. This vector U˜′ could
function as the input U˜ to the Omniscient Adversary algorithm
operated over a packet-size ∆n, with a probability of decoding
error that is exponentially small in ∆n; however, we actually
use a hash of U˜′ to generate the input U˜ to the Omniscient
Adversary algorithm. To be more precise, U˜ = V U˜′, where
V is any square MDS code generator matrix 1 of dimension
(C−zO− δn)∆n, known to all parties Alice, Bob, and Calvin.
As we see later, hashing U˜′ with V strengthen the secrecy of S
(and enables the proof of Claim 5 below). Alice then uses the
encoder for the Omniscient Adversary algorithm to generate X2
from U˜.
The two components of X , i.e., X1 and X2, respectively
correspond to the information Alice wishes to transmit to Bob,
and an implementation of the low rate secret channel. The
fraction of the packet-size corresponding to X2 is “small”,
i.e., ∆. Finally, Alice implements the classical random encoder
described in §IV-B.
Bob’s Encoder: Bob arranges his received packets into the ma-
trix Y = [Y1 Y2]. The sub-matrices Y1 and Y2 are respectively
the network transforms of X1 and X2.
Bob decodes in two steps. Bob first decodes Y2 to obtain S.
He begins by using the Omniscient Adversary decoder to obtain
the vector U˜. He obtains U˜′ from U˜, by multiplying by V −1.
He then extracts from U˜′ the b(C + 1) symbols corresponding
to S. The following claim, proved in the Appendix, ensures that
S is indeed secret from Calvin.
Claim 5: The probability that Calvin guesses S correctly is
at most q−b(C+1), i.e., S is information-theoretically secret from
Calvin.
Thus Alice has now shared S with Bob. Bob uses S as the side
information used by the decoder of the Shared Secret algorithm
1 Secret Sharing protocols [24] demonstrate that using MDS code generator
matrices guarantees that to infer even a single symbol of U˜′ from U˜ requires
the entire vector U˜.
8Adversarial
Strength
Rate Complexity
Shared
Secret
zO < C,
zI = network
C − zO O(nC
2)
Omniscient zO < C/2,
zI = network
C − 2zO O((nC)
3)
Limited zI+2zO < C C − zO O(nC2 + (δnC)3)
TABLE III—Comparison of our three algorithms
to decode Y1. This enables him to recover X1, which contains
Alice’s information at rate R = C − zO. Since the Limited
Adversary algorithm is essentially a concatenation of the Shared
Secret algorithm with the Omniscient Adversary algorithm,
the computational cost is the sum of the computational costs
of the two (with ∆n replacing n as the block-length for
the Shared Secret algorithm). This quantity therefore equals
O(nC2 + (∆nC)3). 2
A. Limited Adversary: Universal Codes
We now discuss how to convert the above algorithm to
be independent of the network parameters zO and zI . Alice’s
challenge is to design for all possible zO and zI pairs that satisfy
the constraint (14). For any specific zI , Alice needs to worry
only about the largest zO that satisfies (14) because what works
against an attacker with a particular traffic injection strength
works against all weaker attackers. Note that C, zO, and zI are
all integers, and thus there are only C − 1 such attackers. For
each of these attackers, Alice designs a different secrecy matrix
X2 as described above. She appends these C−1 matrices to her
information X1 and sends the result as described in the above
section.
To decode Bob needs to estimate which secrecy matrix to
use, i.e., which one of them is secret from the attacker. For
this he needs a good upper bound on zO. But, just as in the
omniscient adversary algorithm, he can obtain this by computing
the column rank of Y , and subtracting b from it. He then decodes
using the secrecy matrix corresponding to (zO, C − 1 − 2zO).
This secrecy matrix suffices since zI can at most be C−1−2zO,
which corresponds to Calvin’s highest eavesdropping strength
for this zO. 2
X. CONCLUSION
Random network codes are vulnerable to Byzantine adver-
saries. This work makes them secure. We provide algorithms
which are information-theoretically secure and rate-optimal for
different adversarial strengths as shown in Table I. When the
adversary is omniscient, we show how to achieve a rate of
C − 2zO, where zO is the number of packets the adversary
injects and C is the network capacity. If the adversary cannot
observe everything, our algorithms achieve a higher rate, C−zO.
Both rates are optimal. Further our algorithms are practical; they
are distributed, have polynomial-time complexity and require no
changes at the internal nodes.
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APPENDIX
A. Proof of Claim 1
The parity-check matrix P is, by construction, a Vandermonde ma-
trix [26], and therefore has full row rank. Further, since P is hidden
9from Calvin, with probability at least 1 − Cnq−1 he cannot choose
interference such that the matrix product EP has a lower column rank
than does E (the proof of this statement follows from [12]). 2
B. Proof of Claim 2
The proof of Claim 2 follows directly from [11]. Essentially, it is a
consequence of the fact that with high probability over network code
design, Tˆ and S both individually have full column rank, and the vector
spaces their columns intersect only in the zero vector. Hence (10) the
transform corresponding to [Tˆ S] has full column rank. 2
C. Proof of Claim 3
Rewriting the right-hand side of (11) and substituting for Y from (7)
results in
TˆX + TZ→Y (Z − LX) = Tˆ [0 F
X Ib] + T
′′[IzO F
Z 0]. (15)
Since the columns of T ′′ are spanned by the columns of [Tˆ TZ→Y ],
therefore we may write T ′′ as TˆM1 + TZ→YM2, where the matrices
M1 and M2 represent the appropriate basis transformation. Thus (15)
becomes
TˆX + TZ→Y (Z − LX) =
Tˆ
“
[0 FX Ib]
”
+
“
TˆM1 + TZ→YM2
”
[IzO F
Z 0]. (16)
Since the vector spaces spanned by the columns of Tˆ and TZ→Y are
disjoint (except in the zero vector), therefore we may compare the term
multiplying the matrix Tˆ on both sides of 16 (we may also compare
the term corresponding to TZ→Y , but this gives us nothing useful).
This comparison gives us the equation
TˆX = [0 FX Ib] + TˆM1[IzO F
Z 0]. (17)
We split the matrix equation (15) into three parts, corresponding to
the sub-matrices X1, X2 and X3] of X. Thus (17) now splits into the
three equations
TˆX1 = TˆM1IzO , (18)
TˆX2 = TˆF
X + TˆM1F
Z , and (19)
TˆX3 = Tˆ . (20)
The equation (20) is trivial, since it only reiterates that X3 equals
columns of an identity matrix. The equation (18) allows us to estimate
that M1 equals X1. We are finally left with (19), which by substituting
for M1 from (18) reduces to
TˆX2 = Tˆ
“
FX +X1F
Z
”
. (21)
2
D. Proof of Claim 4
We rewrite the term X1FZ in (21) as (FZTXT2 )T . We denote by
X˜
′
1 the vector obtained by stacking the columns of XT2 one after the
other. Let D = [D1 D2], where D2 corresponds to the last b2 columns
of D and D1 corresponds to the remaining columns of D. Define
α = n − (b + zO). Denote by ~FX the vector formed by stacking
columns of the matrix FX one after the other, and by fi,j the (i, j)th
entry of the matrix FZT . The system of linear equations (12)-(13) can
be written in matrix form as
A
„
X˜
′
1
X˜2
«
=
„
Tˆ ~FX
−D2I˜
«
where A is given by
2
66666666664
−f1,1Tˆ −f2,1Tˆ . . . −fzO,1Tˆ Tˆ 0 . . . . . . 0
−f1,2Tˆ −f2,2Tˆ . . . −fzO,2Tˆ 0 Tˆ 0 . . . 0
−f1,3Tˆ −f2,3Tˆ . . . −fzO,3Tˆ
.
.
. 0 Tˆ 0 0
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
. 0
.
.
. 0
−f1,αTˆ −f2,αTˆ . . . −fzO,αTˆ 0 0 0 0 Tˆ
D1
3
77777777775
This matrix A is described by smaller dimensional matrices as
entries. The matrix Tˆ has dimensions (b + zO) × b. The jth row
of matrices in the top portion of matrix A describes an equation
corresponding to the jth column of the matrix equation in Equation 12.
The bottom portion of A corresponds to Equation 13.
Bob can recover the variables X(i, j) if and only if the above
matrix A has full column rank. We now analyze A to show that this
is indeed the case (with high probability) for sufficiently large δn.
Let ε > 0 be a small constant. Since, with high probability, Tˆ has
full column-rank, the last αb columns of the matrix (represented by the
right side of A) have full column rank with probability at least 1− ε.
We now address the left columns of A. Consider performing
column operations from right to left, to zero out the Tˆ s in the left
side of the top rows of A (that is, to zero out the upper left sub-matrix
of A). A has full column rank iff after this process the lower left sub-
matrix of A has full column rank. We show that this is the case with
high probability over the random elements of D (when δn is chosen
to be sufficiently large).
Let fij ’s be the values appearing in the upper left sub-matrix
of A. We show that for any (adversarial) choice of fij ’s, with high
probability, the act of zeroing out the Tˆ ’s yields a lower left sub-
matrix of A with full column rank. Then using the union bound on all
possible values of fij we obtain our assertion.
For any fixed values of fij , let C(j), for j = 1 to bzO, denote
the columns of the lower left sub-matrix of A after zeroing out the
Tˆ ’s. For each j, the vector C(j) is a linear combination of the (lower
part of the) jth column of A with columns from the lower right sub-
matrix of A. As the entries of D1 are independent random variables
uniformly distributed in Fq, the columns C(j) for j = 1, . . . , bzO
consist of independent entries that are also uniformly distributed in Fq.
Standard analysis shows that the probability that the columns C(j) are
not independent is qbzO−δn. For the union bound we would like this
probability to be at most q−αzO−nε = q−(n−(b+zO))zO−nε. Thus, it
suffices to take δn = n(zO+ε) for an error probability of at most q−nε.
Recall that b = C−zO. We conclude that the total rate of X transmitted
in our scheme is ((n−b)b−δn)/n = ((n−C)(C−2zO)+logq 1ε )/n.
As n grows large, the rate approaches C − 2zO as desired. 2
E. Proof of Claim 5
The vector U˜ was generated from U˜′ via an MDS code generator
matrix (see Footnote 1), and a folklore result about network codes
is that with high probability over random network code design the
linear transform between Alice and Calvin also has the MDS property.
Thus, for Calvin to infer even a single symbol of the length-(C −
zO −nδ)n∆ vector U˜′, he needs to have received at least (C − zO −
nδ)n∆ linear combinations of the variables in the secrecy matrix X2.
Since Calvin can overhear zI packets, he has access to zIn∆ equations
that are linear in the unknown variables. The difference between the
number of variables unknown to Calvin, and the number of equations
Calvin has, is linear in n∆ – for large enough n∆, this difference is
larger than b(C +1), the length of the vector S. By a direct extension
of [24], Calvin’s probability of guessing any function of S correctly is
q−b(C+1). 2

